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ABSTRACT 
 
This real world case study investigates how priority of claim interacts with the rules of bankruptcy 
to preserve the values of securities issued by corporations in the context of one of the most famous 
reorganizations of all times. (However, many facts have been changed to facilitate classroom use.) 
The case does not presume prior knowledge of the rules of bankruptcy. It is recommended for a 
senior-level undergraduate or MBA course in financial management. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
n 1892, the Richmond & West Point Terminal Railway and Warehouse Co., along with several of its 
subsidiaries, defaulted on interest obligations, and the president of the company, John H. Inman, was 
appointed its receiver. During the next two years, two factions vied for control of the company, one 
representing the incumbent owners, directors and managers, and the other representing prospective ownership 
organized by the investment banking house of J.P. Morgan (Daggart, 1908; Klein, 1970). 
 
The Richmond & West Point Terminal Railway & Warehouse Co. (“the Terminal Co.”) was organized in 
1880 to enable the Richmond & Danville RR (“the R&D”) to consolidate its control of a system of railroads in the 
southeast portion of the United States, generally running from Alexandria and Richmond, VA, to Atlanta, GA (see 
Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1:  The Richmond & Danville RR, circa 1892 
 
I 
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The R&D was prohibited by its charter from owning stocks in companies with which it did not directly 
connect, whereas the Terminal Co. was empowered by its charter to own stocks in railroad companies in the states 
of North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and others. At about the 
same time, two other north-south systems were being organized in the southeast: the Atlantic Coast and the 
Seaboard systems. In all three cases, northern capitalists were involved, gaining control of short lines through stock 
purchases and leases of originally independent lines, constructing connecting lines, where necessary, and increasing 
the capacity of roads through reconstruction and by adding locomotives, cars, signaling equipment, and so forth 
(Stover, 1955). By 1883, the R&D and the Terminal Co. owned, leased and otherwise controlled some 2,500 miles 
of railroad (refer to the following chart). 
 
Richmond & Danville RR/Richmond & West Point Terminal Ry & Warehouse Co. 1883 
 
Richmond & Danville RR (Richmond to Danville VA) ......................................................................................................  152 miles 
Piedmont RR (Danville VA to Greensboro NC)  ..................................................................................................................  49 miles 
North Carolina RR (Goldsboro via Greensboro to Charlotte NC)  ..................................................................................... 233 miles 
Atlanta & Charlotte Air-Line Ry (Charlotte NC to Atlanta GA)  .......................................................................................  339 miles 
Virginia Midland Ry (Alexandria via Charlottesville to Danville VA)  ..............................................................................  237 miles 
Western North Carolina RR (Salisbury to Paint Rock NC) ................................................................................................  206 miles 
Charlotte, Columbia & Augusta RR (Charlotte NC via Columbia SC to Augusta GA)  .....................................................  191 miles 
Columbia & Greenville RR  ...............................................................................................................................................  165 miles 
Georgia Pacific Ry (Atlanta GA to Greenville MS)  ...........................................................................................................  302 miles 
Total (includes numerous branch lines not listed above)  ................................................................................................. 2,503 miles 
 
When the Terminal Co. was organized in 1880, the R&D acquired a large majority of its stock. The R&D 
paid for the shares of the Terminal Co. in part with its own stock. By 1883, the R&D owned $7.51 million of the $15 
million of stock outstanding of the Terminal Co. (i.e., a bare majority); and, the Terminal Co. owned about 10 
percent of the $5 million of stock outstanding of the R&D (a non-controlling minority).  
 
By 1886, however, a conflict developed between the R&D and the Terminal Co. Management of the R&D 
attempted to wrest control of the railroads owned by the Terminal Co. by leasing them, effectively relegating the 
Terminal Co. to the status of an empty shell. The R&D then sold off its stake in the Terminal Co. (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2:  Relationship between the Richmond & Danville RR and the Terminal Co. through 1886 
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Figure 3:  Relationship between the Richmond & Danville RR and the Terminal Co. following 1886 
 
The Terminal Co. responded by acquiring another 41 percent of the stock of the R&D, bringing its total 
stake in the R&D to 51 percent. The Terminal Co. raised the necessary funds by issuing new preferred and common 
stock. During the contest for control of the R&D, the market value of its stock was raised temporarily to $200 per 
share (as compared to its par value of $100 per share). After it gained control of the R&D, the Terminal Co. 
acquired almost all the remaining stock of the R&D, thereby consolidating its control over the system (see Figure 3). 
 
During the next few years, the Terminal Co. conducted an ambitious program of expansion by acquisition. 
In 1887, the company acquired control of the East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia Ry, about 1,600 miles in length, 
shortly following its reorganization. The East Tennessee generally operated on the west slope of the Appalachian 
Mountains, roughly parallel to the R&D, from Bristol, TN, to Mobile, AL, with a line to the Atlantic Ocean from 
Macon, GA, to Brunswick, GA. In 1888, the Terminal Co. acquired control of the Central RR of Georgia, about 
2,300 miles in length, mostly operating within the state of Georgia. Together with other acquisitions, by 1889, the 
Terminal Co. was operating one of the largest railroad systems in the country (see the following chart). 
 
Richmond & West Point Terminal Ry & Warehouse Co. 1889 
 
Richmond & Danville system  .........................................................................................................................................  3,090 miles 
East Tennessee system  ....................................................................................................................................................  1,628 miles 
Central of Georgia system  ..............................................................................................................................................  2,303 miles 
Total  ................................................................................................................................................................................. 7,021 miles 
 
 
Consolidating its control over the R&D, obtaining control over the East Tennessee and Central of Georgia 
systems, other acquisitions, and various improvements to its roads saddled the Terminal Co. and its subsidiaries with 
very large interest expense on bonds and rental expense on leased roads. Fortunately, through 1891, revenue and 
income of the Terminal Co. and its subsidiaries were generally rising, as is illustrated in the income statements of 
the R&D, shown in Tables 1 to 3 (Poor, 1884-1895). Strength in revenue and income enabled the Terminal Co. and 
its subsidiaries to meet their heavy fixed expenses and as well as make dividend payments on at least some of the 
stocks of its subsidiaries, including the R&D in 1889. 
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By 1889, John H. Inman, originally of Georgia, had established himself as 
firmly in charge of the Terminal Co. He was president of both it and the R&D, and 
was joined on the boards of directors of the two companies by his brother Samuel 
Inman and several key northern capitalists, the most prominent of which was Jay 
Gould, “the scion of Wall Street.” Mr. Inman had himself profited very 
handsomely from his control of the Terminal Co., having had a significant interest 
in the Central of Georgia at the time of its sale to the Terminal Co. To maintain his 
control over the vast system of roads encompassed by the Terminal Co., almost of 
Mr. Inman’s personal wealth was invested in the junior securities of the Terminal 
Co., such as third mortgage bonds, income bonds, and preferred and common 
stocks, securities whose market values depended critically on the ability of the 
Terminal Co. and its subsidiaries to continue to grow its revenue and income. But, 
these securities could easily become worthless if a downturn in business forced the 
company to default on its obligations. 
 
Table 1:  Income Statements for years ending June 30th 
 
1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 
Revenue-Passengers 909,564  955,184  985,709  998,023  1,017,312  1,190,604  
Revenue-Freight 2,606,225  2,511,760  2,660,755  2,646,434  2,716,699  2,844,116  
Revenue-Mail, etc. 290,003  333,437  334,891  348,024  418,981  475,528  
Total Revenue 3,805,792  3,800,381  3,981,355  3,992,481  4,152,992  4,510,248  
Maintenance of Road     486,128  457,911  508,515  555,582  
Maintenance of Equipment     831,185  748,218  815,731  928,630  
Other Operating Expenses 2,218,853  2,204,139  914,173  915,424  963,611  1,085,513  
Operating Expenses 2,218,853  2,204,139  2,231,486  2,121,553  2,287,857  2,569,725  
Operating Income 1,586,939  1,596,242  1,749,869  1,870,928  1,865,135  1,940,523  
Other Income (Loss) 56,676  68,606  17,793  19,547  202,170  257,061  
Total Income 1,643,615  1,664,848  1,767,662  1,890,475  2,067,305  2,197,584  
Taxes* 0  0  0  0  0  0  
Rents 979,814  979,654  879,654  879,654  879,654  880,104  
Interest 415,566  433,836  562,890  567,864  600,328  684,058  
Other fixed charges** 135,678  172,113  40,553  20,140  1,536  (63,368) 
Fixed Charges 1,531,058  1,585,603  1,483,097  1,467,658  1,481,518  1,500,794  
Dividends 0  0  0  0  0  0  
Surplus 112,557  79,245  284,565  422,817  585,787  696,790  
 
1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 
Revenue-Passengers 1,210,517  1,573,271  1,498,815  1,459,332  1,359,152  1,219,102  
Revenue-Freight 3,182,145  3,430,446  3,290,443  3,127,291  2,963,307  2,656,819  
Revenue-Mail, etc. 519,473  596,996  1,158,101  1,358,160  823,158  879,181  
Total Revenue 4,912,136  5,600,713  5,947,359  5,944,783  5,145,617  4,755,102  
Maintenance of Road 683,211  774,834  499,227  455,689  622,220  654,423  
Maintenance of Equipment 1,086,856  1,152,919  1,227,043  1,185,471  1,337,190  1,211,504  
Other Operating Expenses 1,151,272  1,183,698  1,211,352  1,355,969  1,360,903  1,441,234  
Operating Expenses 2,921,339  3,111,451  2,937,622  2,997,129  3,320,313  3,307,161  
Operating Income 1,990,797  2,489,262  3,009,737  2,947,654  1,825,304  1,447,941  
Other Income (Loss) 340,708  (188,896) (116,516) (117,843) 0  0  
Total Income 2,331,505  2,300,366  2,893,221  2,829,811  1,825,304  1,447,941  
Taxes* 0  0  0  89,414  83,973  0  
Rents 834,500  851,500  851,500  851,500  834,500  834,500  
Interest 700,498  710,398  802,198  919,528  1,004,765  1,006,689  
Other fixed charges** 7,379  (12,407) 71,521  (10,276) (200,778) (109,403) 
Fixed Charges 1,542,377  1,549,491  1,725,219  1,760,752  1,638,487  1,731,786  
Dividends 500,000  500,000  500,000  500,000  0  0  
Surplus 289,128  250,875  668,002  479,645  102,844  (283,845) 
*when reported, otherwise included in other operating expenses. 
**this figure is simply the difference between fixed charges reported by the company and estimates of its rent and interest 
expenses based on its outstanding bonds and lease agreements. 
Journal of Business Case Studies – May/June 2010 Volume 6, Number 3 
47 
Table 2:  Balance Sheets for years ending June 30th 
 
1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 
ASSETS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fixed Assets 13,446,726  13,879,690  16,307,708  15,497,303  16,334,491  18,683,520  
Working Assets 938,727  897,938  958,040  3,663,306  3,201,062  3,157,192  
Total 14,385,453  14,777,628  17,265,748  19,160,609  19,535,553  21,840,712  
LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Capital Stock 5,000,000  5,000,000  5,000,000  5,000,000  5,000,000  5,000,000  
Funded Debt 6,712,150  7,032,150  9,381,500  9,464,400  10,196,300  11,772,220  
Working Liabilities 1,676,512  1,635,924  1,523,939  3,164,874  2,430,064  2,682,001  
Profit & Loss 996,791  1,109,554  1,360,309  1,531,335  1,909,189  2,386,491  
Total 14,385,453  14,777,628  17,265,748  19,160,609  19,535,553  21,840,712  
 
1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 
ASSETS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fixed Assets 19,312,142  22,300,909  25,465,605  30,793,157  31,555,602  32,825,467  
Working Assets 3,439,172  3,296,939  4,165,391  4,285,763  3,611,549  2,492,944  
Total 22,751,314  25,597,848  29,630,996  35,078,920  35,167,151  35,318,411  
LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Capital Stock 5,000,000  5,000,000  5,000,000  5,000,000  5,000,000  5,000,000  
Funded Debt 12,138,040  13,428,160  14,171,160  16,341,160  18,167,705  18,826,002  
Working Liabilities 3,004,271  4,397,609  6,946,583  9,660,089  10,036,483  8,501,732  
Profit & Loss 2,609,003  2,772,079  3,513,253  4,077,671  1,962,963  2,990,677  
Total 22,751,314  25,597,848  29,630,996  35,078,920  35,167,151  35,318,411  
 
 
Table 3:  Operating Statistics for years ending June 30th (Passenger-miles and ton-miles in thousands) 
 
1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 
Miles of Road 2,514  2,617  2,617  2,336  2,336  2,336  
Locomotives 123  126  126  150  150  150  
Passenger Cars 96  100  100  105  105  105  
Freight Cars 2,316  2,351  2,351  2,525  2,525  2,525  
Passenger-miles 30,965  32,346  30,716  29,030  28,528  38,099  
Per Pass-mile (¢) 2.94  2.95  3.21  3.44  3.57  3.13  
Ton-miles 125,513  120,017  132,556  137,533  153,867  207,315  
Per Ton-mile (¢) 2.08  2.09  2.01  1.92  1.77  1.37  
 
1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 
Miles of Road 3,077  3,202  3,232  3,226  3,311  3,244  
Locomotives 158  195  232  384  381  325  
Passenger Cars 118  246  270  314  329  266  
Freight Cars 3,363  3,355  4,670  9,678  9,651  8,740  
Passenger-miles 27,696  32,346  35,785  36,023  35,332  31,976  
Per Pass.-mile (¢) 4.37  4.86  4.19  4.05  3.85  3.81  
Ton-miles 243,886  258,669  274,521  275,938  298,969  268,003  
Per Ton-mile (¢) 1.30  1.33  1.20  1.13  0.99  0.99  
 
 
RAILROAD REORGANIZATION, 19
TH
 CENTURY STYLE 
 
While revenue and income had been generally increasing for the Terminal Co. through the early 1890s, 
examination of the operating statistics of the R&D, shown in Table 3, reveals a troubling development. While the 
physical volume of business (i.e., passengers-miles and freight ton-miles) was growing strongly, freight rates were 
on the decline, as eventually would be passenger rates. For reasons beyond the scope of this case, the country was 
experiencing a long, gradual deflation, making debt and other fixed-dollar obligations increasingly burdensome. 
 
For a time, the Terminal Co. outpaced the deflation by expanding its physical volume of business and by 
reducing unit costs through productivity-increasing investments. Eventually, however, the deflation so burdened 
debtors – whether farmers, railroads or banks – that productivity growth was insufficient to prevent default. And, 
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upon an uptick in defaults and widespread concern for the solvency of debtors, came the bank panics and financial 
crises characteristic of that time. 
 
Not only the Terminal Co., but many other great and not so great railroads were forced into receiverships 
during the late 19
th
 century. Among these were the Baltimore & Ohio RR and Reading RR (two of the four railroads 
on the Monopoly game board), the Central Pacific RR and Union Pacific RR (which together formed the nation’s 
first transcontinental railroad), the Norfolk & Western Railway, and the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe RR. 
 
Typically, in railroad receiverships of the late 19
th
 century, a new company was organized to acquire the 
assets of the failed company, following a reorganization plan that respected the priority of claim of the securities that 
had been issued by the failed company (Hansen, 2000; Martin, 1974; Swain, 1898). (Some changes have occurred in 
corporate bankruptcies over the years; e.g., assessments are today rare.)  During the time it took for the new 
company to be organized and for a proposed reorganization plan to be developed and gain sufficient acceptance by 
creditors, the railroad was operated by a court-appointed receiver, not unusually the president of the failed company. 
In most of these reorganizations: 
 
1. Well-secured bonds of the failed company were simply assumed, undisturbed, by the new company. 
2. Intermediate securities might suffer a small loss, such as being exchanged for new securities that pay 
interest or dividends only if earned (e.g., income bonds, which pay interest only if the income of the 
company is sufficient). 
3. Some inferior securities might be exchanged for new securities only upon the payment of a cash assessment 
as was needed by the new company to restore the road and equipment inherited from the failed company to 
good working order, to pay interest arrears on well-secured bonds, and to pay the failed company’s 
receiver’s certificates and floating debt. 
4. Some inferior securities might be completely wiped out. 
 
To illustrate, consider a small railroad company that had issued $1 million of 5 percent 1
st
 mortgage bonds, 
$1 million of 5 percent 2
nd
 mortgage bonds, and $1 million of stock, which had earnings of $75,000 per year (which 
amount would be insufficient to pay interest on both the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 mortgage bonds), and which had developed a 
floating debt of $100,000. 
 
One possible reorganization plan for this company would be for a proposed new company to assume the 
failed company’s 1st mortgage bonds, and to offer $1,000 5 percent income bonds in the new company plus ten 
shares of stock in the new company, each having a par value of $100, for $100 cash plus $1,000 2
nd
 mortgage bonds 
of the failed company. Notice that, in this reorganization, the stock of the failed company would be wiped out. 
 
Another possible reorganization plan would be for a proposed new company to assume the failed 
company’s 1st mortgage bonds (as in the first plan), to exchange $1,000 of 5 percent income bonds in the new 
company for $1,000 5 percent 2
nd
 mortgage bonds in the failed company, and to offer shares of stock in the new 
company, having a par value of $100 each, for $10 cash plus $100 par value of shares in the failed company, to the 
holders of the failed company’s stock. Notice that, in this alternate reorganization, the stockholders of the failed 
company are not completely wiped out, but they do have to advance the cash necessary to pay off the floating debt 
of the failed company. 
 
If the stockholders of the failed company believe that the revenue and income will recover, then paying the 
$10 per share assessment might appear to be attractive. With the assessment, they would “redeem” the company by 
paying off the floating debt, and – assuming that the revenue and income of the company do indeed recover – the 
company should be able to pay the full 5 percent interest on its new income bonds, and even pay dividends on its 
new stock. 
 
The problem with this stockholder-friendly reorganization plan is that if the holders of the failed company’s 
2
nd
 mortgage bonds aren’t satisfied with the exchange of their bonds for income bonds, they could make an 
alternative proposal, e.g., the first, in which they redeem the company. Generally, any class of creditors that would 
suffer a loss in a bankruptcy plan has the option of proposing a plan of its own. This motivates the directors and 
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officers of the failed company, representing the interests of the shareholders of the failed company, to make an offer 
that treats all classes of creditors fairly, given their priorities of claim and a reasonable estimate of the company’s 
earning power upon its reorganization. 
 
Table 4 details the claims structure of the R&D and its leased roads as of 1894. Direct obligations of the 
company amount to $18.9 million in debt and $5 million in equity.  Indirect obligations of the company, the interest 
and dividend payments on which were all guaranteed as part of the leases involved, amount to another $12.6 million. 
 
 
Table 4:  Claims Structure of the Richmond & Danville RR, 1894 
Security Amount 1st Mortgage* 2nd Mortgage* 3rd Mortgage* 
BALANCE SHEET 
    Receiver’s certificates 1,696,020 
   Richmond & Danville eq 5s 1909 1,582,000 Equipment 
  Richmond & Danville eq 6s 1906 909,000 Equipment 
  other equipment trusts 746,822 Equipment 
  Richmond & Danville gen 6s 1915 5,996,000 152 0 0 
Richmond & Danville deb 6s 1927 3,368,000 0 152 0 
Richmond & Danville cons 5s 1936 4,528,160 0 0 152 
Richmond & Danville stk 5,000,000 
   LEASED LINES 
    Atlanta & Charlotte. 1st 7s 1907 4,750,000 339 0 0 
Atlanta & Charlotte. inc 6s 1900 750,000 0 339 0 
Atlanta & Charlotte. 5% stk 1,700,000 0 0 339 
North Carolina 6½ % stk 4,000,000 233 0 0 
Piedmont 1st 8s 1894 400,000 49 0 0 
Piedmont 2nd 6s 1900 500,000 0 49 0 
Piedmont 6% stk 500,000 0 0 49 
*miles of railroad unless otherwise stated 
 
 
MANAGEMENT’S PLAN 
 
Mr. Inman was determined that, if possible, the shareholders would redeem the R&D, the strongest 
component of the Terminal Co., and the incumbent directors and officers would remain in place. Furthermore, if the 
R&D could be reorganized by management, it might be possible that most, if not all of the other roads in the system 
could be salvaged, preserving the fortunes of those who had invested heavily in the junior securities of the system 
(this would include preserving his own fortune). Unfortunately, the shareholders of the company had very little cash 
with which to redeem the company. A reorganization plan for the R&D required the following: 
 
1. $3 to 5 million in cash to pay off the receiver’s certificates and reduce the company’s working liabilities to 
a manageable level. 
2. Reduce the company’s fixed charges by at least $300,000 so as to enable it to avoid another default if the 
depression were to continue. 
 
The plan developed by management consisted, basically, of three parts:  (1) Ten percent assessments on all 
classes of credit and on equity, in order to raise $3.5 million in cash; (2) Using the $3.5 million to pay off $1.7 
million of receiver’s certificates and reduce the company’s working liabilities by $1.8 million; and, (3) converting 
the fixed interest and rent obligations on the third mortgage claims of the company and its leased roads into 
obligations contingent on the earnings of the company, thus reducing the company’s fixed charges by a little more 
than $300,000 (see Table 5). 
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Table 5:  Management’s Reorganization Plan 
Security Amount Assessment Disposition Fixed Charges 
BALANCE SHEET 
 
10% each  Before After 
Receiver’s certificates 1,696,020   Paid off   
R&D eq 5s 1909 1,582,000  158,200  Assumed 79,100  79,100  
R&D eq 6s 1906 909,000  90,900  Assumed 54,540  54,540  
other equipment trusts 746,822  74,682  Assumed 44,809  44,809  
R&D gen 6s 1915 5,996,000  599,600  Assumed 359,760  359,760  
R&D deb 6s 1927 3,368,000  336,800  Assumed 202,080  202,080  
R&D cons 5s 1936 4,528,160  452,816  Exch for income bonds 226,408  0  
Richmond & Danville stk 5,000,000  500,000  Assumed 0  0  
LEASED LINES 
 
    
Atlanta & Charlotte 1st 7s 4,750,000  475,000  Assumed 332,500  332,500  
Atlanta & Charlotte inc 6s 750,000  75,000  Assumed 45,000  45,000  
Atlanta & Charlotte 5% stk 1,700,000  170,000  Div contingent on income 85,000  85,000  
North Carolina 6½% stk 4,000,000  400,000  Assumed 260,000  260,000  
Piedmont 1st 8s 1894 400,000  40,000  Assumed 32,000  32,000  
Piedmont 2nd 6s 1900 500,000  50,000  Assumed 30,000  30,000  
Piedmont 6% stk 500,000  50,000  Div contingent on income 30,000 0 
TOTALS 
 
3,472,998   1,781,197  1,439,789  
 
 
ENTER J.P. MORGAN 
 
By the 1890s, J.P. Morgan had established himself as the most powerful 
investment banker in the world. During that decade, he was instrumental in the 
reorganization of several large railroad systems, and even in helping the U.S. government 
maintain the gold standard. He later became associated with the organization of several 
large “trusts,” or industrial monopolies, including U.S. Steel. Mr. Morgan seemed to 
enjoy both making money and using his wealth to pursue science, the arts, and beauty. 
His many benefactions include the Morgan collection of gems at the Metropolitan 
Museum of Natural History, and the founding of the Metropolitan Museum of Art. But, 
no matter how intelligent, witty, rich and powerful he was, he still had a big ugly nose.  
 
The reorganization plan for the R&D proposed by management seemed to Mr. 
Morgan to both undervalue the earning ability of the railroad upon a turn-around of the 
economy, and impose too severe a loss to the bondholders of the company. Mr. Morgan was committed to the 
principle that bondholders were to be protected from risk in accordance with their priority of claim, and that 
railroads should be run for the benefit of all their stakeholders, paying good wages to workers, lowering fares to 
shippers, and making a good rate of return for their investors. His commitment to these principles gained for his 
banking house the trust of individual investors, insurance companies and banks in the advanced economies of the 
world, and enabled him to raise enormous amounts of money on reasonable terms. 
 
In looking at a company like the R&D, having an immediate need for a substantial amount of cash, Mr. 
Morgan could consider the possibility of raising funds by the sale of stock in the new company at a price reflecting 
reasonable estimates of the future earnings of the company assuming economic recovery. 
 
Indeed, this is exactly what Mr. Morgan wants you to help him with. He wants you to develop an 
alternative reorganization plan to be put forward on behalf of the several classes of bondholders of the company. In 
this alternative plan, the cash needed to reorganize the company is to come from wiping out the stock of the failed 
company, and selling stock in the new company to a syndicate of investors. Remember, that all classes of 
bondholders must receive at least what is offered to them in the plan proposed by management, and that the amount 
offered to each class of creditor must (in this case and almost always) respect priority of claim. 
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